This paper initiates a study of connections between local and global properties of graphical games. Specifically, we introduce a concept of local price of anarchy that quantifies how well subsets of agents respond to their environments. We then show several methods of bounding the global price of anarchy of a game in terms of the local price of anarchy. All our bounds are essentially tight.
Introduction
The model of graphical games [10] , is a recent representation method of games in which the dependencies among the agents are represented by a graph. In a graphical game, each agent is identified by a vertex, and its utility is determined solely by its own action and the actions of its graph neighbors. Note that every game can be represented by a graphical game with a complete graph. Yet, often, a much more succinct representation is possible. While the original motivation of defining graphical games was computational, we believe that an important property of the model is that it enables an investigation of many natural structural properties of games.
In this work we investigate connections between local and global properties of graphical games. Specifically, we study the Price of Anarchy (PoA) which is the ratio between the welfare of a worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal possible welfare [11] .
We introduce a novel notion of a local price of anarchy which quantifies how well subsets of agents respond to their environments. We then study the relations between this local measure and the global price of anarchy of the game. We provide several methods of bounding the global price of anarchy in terms of the local price of anarchy, and demonstrate the tightness of these methods.
One possible interpretation of our results is as follows: if a decentralized system is comprised of smaller, well behaved units, with small overlap between them, then the whole system behaves well. This holds independently of the size of the small units, and even when the small units only behave well on average. This phenomenon may have implications, for example, on organizational theory. From a computational perspective, the price of anarchy of large games is likely to be extremely hard to compute. However, computing the local price of anarchy of small units is relatively easy since they correspond to much smaller games. Once these are computed, our methods can be invoked to bound the price of anarchy of the overall game.
Related work
The model of graphical games was introduced in [10] . The original motivation for the model was computational as it permitted a succinct representation of many games of interest. Moreover, for certain graph families, there are properties that can be computed efficiently. For example, although computing a Nash equilibrium is usually a hard task [5, 4] , it can be computed efficiently for graphical games on graphs with maximum degree 2 [6] . Rather surprisingly, the proofs of the hardness of computing Nash equilibria of normal form games are conducted via reductions to graphical games [5, 4] . [8] investigates the structure of equilibria of graphical games under some symmetry assumptions on the utility of the agents. It shows that in these games, there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium. For such games of incomplete information, [8] shows that there is a monotone relationship between the degree of a vertex and its payoff, and investigates further the connections between the level of information the game possesses and the monotonicity of the players' degree in equilibria. Several works coauthored by Michael Kearns explore economic and game theoretic properties which are related to structure (e.g. [9] ).
The questions addressed in these works are very different from the ones we address here.
The price of anarchy [11] is a natural measure of games. After the discovery of fundamental results regarding the price of anarchy of congestion games [15, 2] , the price of anarchy and the price of stability 1 [1] have become almost standard methods for evaluating games.
[12] investigates deductions that can be made on global properties of graphs after examining only local neighborhoods. It shows that for any graph G, where V [G] = n, and a function f : V → + ∪ {0}, if the local average of f over every ball of positive radius less or equal to r in G is greater or equal to α, the global average of f is at least α n O(1/ log r) .
[12] also demonstrates the tightness of this bound. In this work we make an extensive use of graph covers, but we do not introduce a method for finding them. Algorithms that find good covers can be found, for example, in [3] and [13] . Due to the game theoretic nature of our setup, these algorithms cannot be applied to it directly.
In general, the field of property testing in computer science examines the connections between local and global properties of combinatorial objects (see, for example, [7] for a survey). For many properties it is known that if an object satisfies a property in a local sense, then it is "not too far" from satisfying it globally.
As we shall see, the additivity of the welfare function, enables even stronger connections between the local and the global perspectives in our setup.
Preliminaries
We denote the utility of a player i ∈ [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} by u i . In most of this work we focus on games where the utility of each player is non-negative, i.e., u i ≥ 0. Every player wishes to maximize its own utility. 1 The price of stability is the ratio between the best Nash equilibrium and the optimum of the game. graphical game is a pair (G, M ) , where G is an undirected graph on n vertices and M is an n players finite game. Every player i is associated with the node v i and its utility is determined only by its action and by the actions of its neighbors.
Definition 2.1 [10] (graphical game) An n players
Since we only discuss graphical representations of games in this paper, the terms game and graphical game are treated as synonyms. We note again that every game can be represented as a graphical game. Definition 2.2 (welfare) Let G be a game and let s be a vector of agent strategies. The welfare |s| is the sum of the agents' utilities resulting from s, i.e., |s| = i u i (s) .
The welfare of a game is a common measure of the aggregation of the agents' utilities. It is by no means the only aggregation method. In this paper we focus on maximizing the welfare as the sole criterion of how good a game is. Our results can immediately be generalized to any measure of the form i ψ i (u i (·)) where
Definition 2.3 [14] (Nash equilibrium)
A strategy where no player can unilaterally divert from and increase its utility is called a Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium does not have to be unique. In this work we are only interested in global worst Nash equilibria, i.e. in equilibria that obtain the minimal welfare of the whole game. A global worst Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique but its value is fixed for a game and we can just pick one such arbitrary strategy vector to work with. We denote a global worst Nash equilibrium by GW N E, and its value by |GW N E|. From compactness and continuity considerations, a global worst Nash equilibrium always exists.
We denote by U opt (G) (or just U opt when the context is clear) a strategy vector that achieves the optimal welfare of the game, and by |U opt | the optimal welfare. Note that the price of anarchy is always between 0 and 1. A price of anarchy of 1 means that all Nash equilibria are optimal. It is natural to define the price of anarchy of sub-games as well. We thus denote the PoA of the whole game by GPoA (global price of anarchy).
The following combinatorial definitions are standard. 
For a set S, we let S (−) denote the set S minus its internal boundary (i.e. S (−) contains only nodes that do not have neighbors outside S). We let S (+) denote the set S plus its external boundary (its neighbors).
For a collection of sets S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l }, we let S (−) denote the collection {S Intuitively, a high local price of anarchy means that every set S i in the cover responds well to its neighbors' actions. The local price of anarchy of the set of all players, equals the global PoA of the game. Note that we could focus only on neighbors' actions which are part of a global Nash equilibrium and still obtain all the results in this paper.
We denote by u(S) = max s i u i (s) the maximum welfare that a set S can achieve (over all the possible vectors of strategies of S (+) ). We let u(S) denote the sum of utilities of S when the game is in a global worst Nash equilibrium (the equilibrium is always clear from the context so we suppress it from the notation). Similarly, we let u(i) denote the utility of player i in this equilibrium. Note that if the game is in a global Nash equilibrium then all the subsets are also in local Nash equilibria (i.e., all the induced sub-games are in equilibrium).
A basic bound on the price of anarchy
In this section we introduce a basic lower bound of the global price of anarchy in terms of the local price of anarchy.
cover if the following hold:
S is of width at most β

The collection of interiors S (−) is also a cover
Intuitively, an (α, β)-cover is good when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is high, and β ≥ 1 is low. It is possible to view an (α, β)-cover in the following manner: every set S i is well behaved, that is, reacts well to its external conditions, and the interaction (overlap) between sets is limited. The requirement that S (−) is also a cover, is crucial. Without it, the next theorem could not be established.
Theorem 2 Let G be a graphical game and S an
Proof : We will see that the fact that the local price of anarchy is α helps us in achieving an α factor between every Nash equilibrium of S i and the optimal welfare of S (−) i . The requirement for S (−) to be a cover will thus be used to bound the global optimum, and the width of S will generate the 1/β factor.
Consider a global worst Nash equilibrium. i ). Since the local price of anarchy of S i is at least α,
Summing the former over all the sets in the cover S yields:
Proof : Since S (−) is a cover, the subsets H
the graph. Since the utilities are non negative,
is a cover we get that
where the last inequality is due to the optimality of u(S
Proof : S is of width β at the most. Therefore every element on the left hand side appears at most β times in the sum on the right hand side. 2
Putting all together we get:
Remarks While the local and global price of anarchies refer to Nash equilibria, it is possible to obtain a similar bound for many solution concepts (e.g. correlated or strong equilibria). We note that we do not know how to show an analog of this theorem for the price of stability. The width parameter is purely combinatorial and can be interpreted as a measure of interaction between the sub-games (subsets). The α parameter is a measure of how well the small subsets behave. Later, we will average these parameters and also study the effects of other local parameters on the global price of anarchy. An interesting algorithmic issue is how to decompose a large game into small units such that the resulting bound on the global price of anarchy is as tight as possible, i.e., how to find a good cover.
Covers by balls
One of the most natural ways of obtaining a cover is by taking all balls of a certain radius. 
Examples
Before refining Theorem 2, let us consider a few simple examples. The star-of-cliques game demonstrates how to use the theorem, the example of covering a torus by grids demonstrates the need for refining the basic bound, and the biased consensus game shows that the theorem is tight, i.e., that in the general case, it is not possible to improve the α/β bound.
Due to lack of space, the rest of this section is moved to the Appendix.
Refinements of the basic bound
Averaging the parameters
In the biased consensus game (Example 12), all the induced sub-games of the cover have the same local price of anarchy. Most games do not possess this property, and the basic theorem is thus often wasteful (as LP oA S (G) is the minimum local PoA of the sets in the cover). Similarly, β is the maximum width. For this purpose we generalize the definitions of the local price of anarchy and the width to be an average instead of the minimum and maximum, respectively. We introduce improved bounds on the global price of anarchy using the new definitions. 
Theorem 3 Let G be a graphical game and let
also a cover and S is of width β. Let α = LP oA S (G), then GP oA ≥ α/β.
Proof (sketch):
The proof resembles the one of Theorem 2, and we thus only sketch it.
Let S i ∈ S. If we follow the steps of the proof of Claim 3.2 in the proof of Theorem 2, with the new definition of α i , we will get:
where the 2 nd equality is due to the definition of LP oA S (G), and the first is just a summation of the former.
Like in Claim 3.4, since S is of width β we have that β
is a cover we have that Putting all together we conclude that:
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The above refinement is also interesting for the algorithmic task of finding a good cover. This is because one can look for sub-games with high average PoA instead of a cover with a high minimum PoA.
Next, we consider a weighted version of the width parameter.
Theorem 4 Let G be a graphical game and let
is a cover, and the width of node i ∈ V [G] in S is β i . Define β as the average of β i weighted by the agent utilities in a global worst Nash equilibrium, that is
We can then proceed according to the proof of Theorem 3.
Going back to the star-of-cliques (Example 7), one can see now that in this case β = 1 + for a small = (k, l) whereas β = k + 1 is the non weighted width. This is because, in the proposed cover, the center
, and the weights are roughly the same. Thus, Theorem 4 yields a bound of GP oA(G) ≥ 1 2(1+ ) , instead of the much weaker bound of 1 2(k+1) of the basic theorem. As we noted before, it can be shown that the actual global price of anarchy is slightly greater than 1/2, so the above bound is tight.
Note that in the last theorem we took the average according to the utilities of the agents in the global equilibrium. Therefore, averaging the β parameter may sometimes be less constructive.
Nash expansion
We now introduce a different local parameter that sometimes helps analyzing games which are not well addresses by the previous theorems. This parameter resembles graph expansion parameters but refers directly to the equilibrium welfare so it cannot be deduced solely from the graph. In other words, in every Nash equilibrium, the ratio between the welfare of S (−) and the welfare of its (external) boundary is bounded by
Definition 5.3 (Nash expansion) Let G be a graphical game and S a cover. We say that the Nash expansion of S is ξ = ξ G (S) if for all S i ∈ S the Nash expansion of the set S i is greater or equal ξ.
Observation 5 Let G be a graphical game and S a cover. If the Nash expansion of S is at least ξ = ξ G (S)
then:
Note that ξ is a local parameter that can be obtained by examining each subset S i in isolation. It is possible to show that if a cover S, where S (−) is disjoint, has a Nash expansion of ξ, then its weighted width β is bounded by 1/ξ as well. This yields the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Let G be a graphical game. Let S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l } be a cover with α = LP oA S (G) and a
Nash expansion ξ, such that S (−) is a disjoint cover. Then GP oA(G) ≥ αξ
It is also possible to average ξ and obtain a similar theorem. In Appendix B, we discuss the properties of the expansion parameter further. Specifically, we show that if we can bound the maximum ratio between pairs of players' utilities in a global worst Nash equilibrium, then we can replace the Nash expansion parameter by a simple combinatorial parameter.
Discussion and future research
In real life, almost every game is embedded in a larger game and players are likely to be able to consider only their close vicinity. Thus, we view the investigation of the relations between local and global properties of games as a basic issue in the understanding of large games. This paper demonstrates that at least from the perspective of the price of anarchy, a good local behavior of a game implies a good global behavior. The converse is not necessarily true, and there are many non-trivial questions which are related to bounding the price of anarchy of graphical games. Of course, it is natural to investigate questions, similar to the ones which are studied here, in the context of other properties of games.
In general, we believe that models like graphical games provide an excellent opportunity to introduce many structural properties into games. We believe that such properties arise naturally in many contexts and can give raise to a lot of fruitful research on the border of game theory, combinatorics, and computer science.
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A Examples
A.1 Star-of-cliques
The following toy example demonstrates how to use the basic theorem. We first define the underlying graph.
Definition A.1 ((k, l) star-of-cliques graph) A (k, l) star-of-cliques is a graph G = (V, E), where
That is, the vertices w, v 1 , . . . , v k form a star with w in the center, and for each i, the l vertices
The game has three types of players, w, v, and x. Each agent has two available strategies, 0 and 1. For each vertex y we denote by N a (y) the number of y's neighbors of type a ∈ {w, v, x} that play the same strategy as y, and by N a (y) the number of y's neighbors of type a ∈ {w, v, x} that play the opposite of y. We denote by M aj(y) the strategy of the majority of y's neighbors.
Example 7 ((k, l) star-of-cliques game)
A (k, l) star-of-cliques game, is an n-player game, where the graph of the game is a (k, l)-star-of-cliques, and the utilities of the players are given by: Before we proceed, let us discuss the players' strategies. The center w wants to play as the majority of its neighbors (the v players). Every v player is attached to w and to (l − 1) players of type x. The player wants to play the same strategy as w but the opposite of as many of its x neighbors as possible. Of course, these two goals may be contradictory. For a v player, the payoff for playing the same as w is equal to the payoff of playing the opposite of all its x neighbors. Every player of type x wants to play the opposite of its v neighbor, and the same of as much of its x neighbors as possible.
Consider the cover S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S k , S k+1 }, where
is a ball of radius 1 around v i , and S k+1 is a ball of radius 1 around w. Note that S (−) is a disjoint cover containing the singleton {w} and all the surrounding cliques. In order to apply Theorem 2 to the star-of-cliques game we need a few simple observations.
Observation 8 The width of w is k + 1 and since all other vertices are of lower width this is the width of S.
Observation 9 For every set S i where i ≤ k, the following hold:
• The neighbors of the set only influence w. Since w's utility is negligible if we take large k or l, their strategies hardly effect the welfare of S i .
• From symmetry considerations,w.l.o.g. we can take the strategy of all S i 's neighbors to be 0.
• The v player can guaranty for itself an expected utility of at least l − 1 by playing a mixed strategy of (1/2, 1/2). In the same manner, all the x players can guaranty themselves an expected utility of l − 2, and the w player can guaranty itself 1/2.
• By the previous, in every equilibrium, the welfare of S i is at least l 2 − 2l + 2.5.
• The strategy where the w and v players pick 0 and all the x players pick 1 is an optimum for this set.
Hence, |U opt | = 2(l 2 − 2l + 1.5).
• Putting everything together we get that the local price of anarchy of the set is slightly greater than 1/2. 
Proof (sketch):
The cover S we described is a (1/2, k + 1)-cover. Theorem 2 thus yields the desired bound. 2
Remarks
We note that when all agents play (1/2, 1/2), the result is a Nash equilibrium that gives each agent half of its optimal utility. Since most of the nodes can guarantee themselves 1/2 of their optimal utility, the actual price of anarchy of the game is around 1/2 (this bound can be obtained immediately from Theorem 4). From a qualitative perspective, every set S i≤k responds well to its environment and thus the whole game behaves well. We could of course, complicate the game significantly and still get the same phenomenon.
In particular, we could have imposed on the surrounding cliques, games in which the total welfare of every clique is the same as before but no player can guarantee itself a constant fraction of its optimal utility.
A.2 Covering a torus by grids
Example 11 Let G be an m × m torus, and let k such that k divides m. We let S (−) be a disjoint cover of
Consider the case of k > 2. Here, β = 3, ∀i, |S i | = k 2 + 4k, and |S
When k is large, almost all the vertices have a width of 1. An immediate conclusion of Theorem 2 is as follows.
Corollary A.3 For the torus example, if
In other words, an LPoA of α implies a GPoA of about α/3. The example however demonstrates the need for refining the basic theorem: While the width of the cover is 3, almost all the vertices have a width of 1 and are therefore counted only once in i u(S i ). Thus, typically, one should expect a GPoA of around α and not α/3. This can be addressed by the various refinements of the basic theorem shown in this paper .
A.3 A tight example
Our final example shows that in general, the α/β bound of the basic theorem is essentially tight. For simplicity we focus on pure Nash equilibria.
Example 12 (biased consensus game) Let γ > 1 be a parameter. In a biased consensus game the agent strategies are taken from {0, 1}. The utility of each agent i is defined by: In other words, if a player has a neighbor playing 1 it should play 1 as well, if all its neighbors are playing 0, it should play 0 too. We assume that the graph of the game is connected. 
By the previous, the global price of anarchy is 1/γ
The next observation states that the local PoA of any connected set S is obtained when all its neighbors play 0. We will see that the local PoA is equal to the ratio between the case where all the members of S are playing 0 and the case where all of them play 1.
Observation 14
Consider the biased consensus game and let S be a connected set of agents. Then the following hold:
If at least one of S's neighbors plays 1, the only Nash equilibrium occurs when all the players in S
are playing 1. In this case, this strategy is also optimal for S.
When all the neighbors of S are playing 0, then the worst Nash equilibrium is when all the players in
S are playing 0 and the best strategy is when all of them play 1.
The following proposition shows the tightness of Theorem 2.
Proposition A. 4 For every > 0, there exists a graphical game G, and an (α, β)-cover S, where:
Proof : Consider the biased consensus game played on a d-regular graph and the cover by all balls of radius 1.
By Observation 14, the local PoA of such a ball S, is obtained when all its neighbors are playing 0. In this case, the worst local Nash equilibrium occurs when all the players in the ball are playing 0. This yields a utility of 1/γ to every member of S. In the optimal strategy for S all its members play 1. This strategy vector results in a utility of 1/γ for each of the d boundary nodes of S, and a utility of 1 for the inner node.
Therefore, the local price of anarchy of S equals:
d+γ as all the balls have d + 1 nodes. Since β = d + 1, we have that α/β = 1 (d+γ) . Thus, if we set γ > d/ , we get that
2
B Balanced games and expansion
In many games it is natural that the utilities of the players will be relatively balanced. We now show that when this is the case, the Nash expansion parameter can be replaced by a simple combinatorial parameter.
This can greatly assist in the analysis of many games of interest.
Definition B.1 (Inequality parameter)
We say that the inequality parameter of a game is at least ρ if there exists a global worst Nash equilibrium such that for every two players i, j, u(i) ≥ ρu(j). ρ = 1 means that all players have the same utility. Like in previous cases we can also average this parameter and obtain similar results. We avoid doing it for the sake of simplicity. For the same reason the next notion of combinatorial expansion is defined directly for a cover and not for single sets first.
Definition B.2 (Combinatorial expansion)
Let S be a cover for a graph G. The combinatorial expansion
In other words, ξ , is the ratio between the sum of the number of elements in the sets without the boundary, and this sum of the whole sets. Note that this local parameter is purely combinatorial and does not refer to the utilities of the players.
Lemma B.3
Let G be a graphical game with an inequality parameter ρ. Let S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l } be a cover such that:
Then GP oA ≥ ραξ .
Proof (sketch):
We know that since α is the local price of anarchy, and S (−) is a cover,
Proof : By the definition of ξ ρξ
Let u(max) and u(min) denote the highest and lowest values of a global worst Nash equilibrium respectively. By the definition of ρ, ρu(max) ≤ u(min). Thus,
By the fact that S (−) is a disjoint cover
We therefore conclude that
Since in the biased consensus game ρ = 1, if we take a cover S where S (−) is a disjoint cover, and α = LP oA S (G), we will have, by Lemma B.3, GP oA ≥ αξ . We can show also that this lemma is tight.
Formally:
Proposition B.5 (tightness) For every > 0, there exists a graphical game G and a cover S, such that:
and: αξ ≤ GP oA ≤ (1 + )αξ .
Consider the biased consensus game (Example 12) played on a torus graph, and consider a cover by k × k grids (Example 11). Lemma B.3 implies that αξ ≤ GP oA. For the other direction, as noted
. By Observation 14, α = k 2 +4k γk 2 +4k
. By choosing γ = 4 k we will get that αξ = 
C Limitations of the method
This section discusses two limitations of our methods. First, we will see that our methods do not apply when the utilities may be negative. Second, we will demonstrate the non-monotonicity of the local price of anarchy. Due to lack of space, most of the proofs are omitted from this section.
C.1 Cost games
In cost games each player i has a non negative cost c i ≥ 0 and the utilities are of the form u i = −c i . The goal of each player is therefore to minimize its cost. The price of anarchy is often defined with respect to cost games (e.g. [15]).
We denote by c(S) the total cost of a set S in a global worst Nash equilibrium, and byĉ(S) the optimal cost for it. We let C opt denote the best vector of strategies. The local price of anarchy of a set S is at most α if for every vector of strategies of the neighbors of S, the ratio between the maximal local equilibrium cost and the minimal total cost is bounded by α. Under this definition, the local price of anarchy is at least 1 where 1 means that all equilibria are optimal.
We now show that our results for positive utility games are not preserved for cost games. Moreover, the gap between the local and global PoAs of cost games may be arbitrarily large. In other words, only if all the neighbors of an agent play 0, it prefers to play 0. The only case where an agent has a low cost is when it and all its neighbors play 1. The local price of anarchy of the above game is low, since if all the neighbors of a set play 0, the cost of the set is high in any case, and if not all neighbors of a connected set play 0 then the only local Nash equilibrium is a local optimum (as all the members of the set must play 1). Since the number of possible covers is finite, an which is small enough, and a γ high enough satisfy the above conditions simultaneously for all non-trivial covers. 2
Theorem 16
C.2 Monotonicity
One potential drawback of the local price of anarchy is that it is not monotone, and therefore it is hard to work with. In this section we first demonstrate the lack of monotonicity for the local price of anarchy, and then continue by describing a different parameter which is monotone. Unfortunately, in many cases, this parameter may yield only very weak bounds. Nevertheless, this is the only monotone parameter that we have found.
We denote the local price of anarchy of a subset S ⊆ V [G], by α S .
C.2.1 Negative
Consider the following family of strict majority games. 2. Consider a majority game G on C 4 . It is not difficult to verify that P oA(G) = b/a, but if S = {v 1 } then α S = 1 and P oA(G) < α S .
3. Consider any game G where GP oA(G) < 1. Consider the disjoint cover S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }, where s i = {v i } are singletons. Since, in equilibrium, players always respond optimally to their environments, ∀i, P oA G (s i ) = 1. Thus, P oA(G) < min i {α S i }.
4. Consider again a majority game G on C 5 . Let S 1 = {v 5 , v 1 } and S 2 = {v 2 , v 3 , v 4 }. We already know that GP oA(G) > b/a and LP oA G (S 1 ) = b/a. We will show that LP oA G (S 2 ) ≤ b/a.
Consider a local Nash equilibrium on S 2 where its neighbors play 0, v 2 play 0 and v 3 , v 4 play 1. It is a Nash equilibrium since no player can play like a strict majority of its neighbors. The welfare of S 2 in this equilibrium is 3b. If all the members of S 2 play 0, the welfare would have been 3a. Therefore LP oA G (S 2 ) ≤ b/a. Thus, we got that GP oA(G) > b/a = max i {α S i }.
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In other words, the local price of anarchy of subsets (S 1 , . . . , S l ) do not say much about the price of anarchy of the whole set S = i S i . It is possible to construct examples in which the ratio between the α S i s and α S is arbitrarily high. Thus, from an algorithmic perspective, it may be difficult to find good covers for general games.
C.2.2 Positive
We now introduce another local parameter which is monotone.
Definition C.2 For a game G and S ⊆ V [G]
, define δ S to be the ratio between welfare of the worst Nash equilibrium on S for every neighbors strategy, denoted by u (S), and the best utility that S can get, that is,
In other words, δ S measures the ratio between the worst possible welfare of S and best welfare that S can hope for. Of course, typically, δ S is very wasteful.
Proposition C.3 Let S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l } be a cover for G, a graphical game. Then GP oA(G) ≥
Unfortunately, it is not difficult to construct examples in which these δ values yield only very weak bounds on the global price of anarchy.
